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Architecture-Based Security for UxVs 
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Abstract 
Current fleet objectives include increased use of unmanned and autonomous systems, 
including a variety of vehicles. Such systems are attractive due to their potential to increase 
effectiveness with reduced cost, size, and risk exposure for personnel. Realizing this vision 
requires better methods of assuring the security of these software-intensive systems, to 
prevent use of these systems from creating new risks, such as that of adversaries taking 
control of our systems and using them against us. 
Navy acquisition has applied Open Systems Architecture principles to improve affordability of 
system development, test, evaluation, and upgrade. This paper explores extension of such 
principles to improve security of unmanned systems within affordable costs. The paper 
illustrates the proposed principles in terms of a case study on development of a secure 
architecture for unmanned surface vehicles that support anti-submarine warfare missions. 
Keywords: Security, Risk Reduction, Unmanned Systems, Open Architecture, Upgrades, 
Affordable Certification 
Introduction 
Many systems of interest to the Navy, including unmanned vehicles of all types 
(UxVs), have physical as well as software and communications components and belong to 
the category known as cyber-physical systems. The interactions between the three kinds of 
components are challenging to analyze and have been studied extensively in the contexts of 
safety and reliability. Certification of software for these types of systems requires 
qualitatively different kinds of approaches than for other types of software. This paper 
proposes that acquisition of these systems also requires different kinds of approaches to 
ensure that unmanned systems will have the needed security properties. 
Security is a key concern in any military application of unmanned systems, because 
their potential advantages could be reversed if adversaries were able to compromise their 
control systems. In the worst case, a capable adversary could take control of our unmanned 
systems and use them against us. Mitigations for this hazard need to fit into a larger context 
that includes policy considerations and unpredictable future conditions. These 
considerations have unexpected implications for requirements and architecture that can 
affect how such systems can be successfully acquired. 
One example of unexpected implications is defending against physical intrusion. 
Even for peacetime applications in friendly areas, vandalism has been a significant problem 
for unmanned systems, for example, in locations such as U.S. inland waterways. Exposure 
to this type of hazard will be more severe for unmanned military vehicles in potentially 
hostile areas.  
Mitigating the hazard of physical intrusion requires rethinking system requirements 
because the rules of engagement and the broader context are different for manned and 
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unmanned platforms. These new requirements involve cost/benefit trade-offs that can be 
difficult to quantify and resolve.  
For example, mitigations for physical intrusions into manned platforms typically 
include deterrence based on defensive weapons on the platform and the possibility of large-
scale retaliation against such hostile action. This is long-standing tacit knowledge usually 
taken for granted without explicit mention, which implicitly affects established requirements 
and designs of military systems. However, these mitigation strategies are less effective for 
unmanned platforms, since retaliation against an attack is less likely for unmanned platforms 
than for manned ones, and unmanned platforms are less likely to carry defensive weapons. 
Multiple considerations limit benefits of defensive weapons on unmanned platforms, 
including 
• Reluctance to authorize autonomous use of weapons due to risk of severe 
consequences if the software makes an incorrect decision, 
• Unanswered questions about who would be legally responsible for damages 
in case of such a system failure, particularly if these failures occur during 
peacetime, 
• Vulnerability of defensive responses to disruption of communications if use of 
unmanned weapons requires authorization by remote human decision-
makers, and 
• Negative impact on cost, size, weight, and energy usage if weapons are 
installed on unmanned platforms that ideally should be cheap, numerous, and 
expendable.  
Desired system behavior may change substantially from peacetime to active conflict. 
Consequences for acquisition include possible requirements for rapid system 
reconfiguration and need for corresponding features in the system architecture to support 
such requirements. For example, unmanned military vehicles may need a kinetic self-
destruct mechanism for use during active conflict, to render captured unmanned vehicles 
useless to adversaries. However, such capabilities should not be deployed during 
peacetime, to prevent collateral damage in situations such as fishermen accidentally 
catching an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in their nets and then being blown up 
when the UUV detects that something is wrong and self-destructs. 
Case Study: USVs for Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was identified by the U.S. Navy as a vital mission 
area for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in 2007 [1], second in priority only to 
minesweeping. The Navy seeks to minimize the exposure of sailors to missions that are dull, 
dirty, or dangerous. Dull missions require vigilance for extended periods and tax a person’s 
concentration. This matches the detection aspect of the ASW mission, which is like 
searching for a needle in a haystack. The Navy USV Master Plan [1] specifically 
recommends USVs for ASW missions known as Maritime Shield and Protected Passage. 
These missions are illustrated in Figure 1, which is reproduced from [2]. 
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Figure 1. Maritime Shield and Protected Passage 
“Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operation” (MODLOC) refers to a 
relatively static area of operations. The purpose of a Maritime Shield mission is to protect a 
strike group from attack submarines while it remains in a MODLOC, while the purpose of a 
Protected Passage mission is to provide similar protection while the strike group is in transit 
from one MODLOC to another [3]. 
Attack submarines are a threat to strike groups because they are capable of 
attacking surface ships and are very difficult to detect when submerged, especially for 
diesel-electric submarines, which are extremely quiet when running on their batteries. 
Ideally, a Maritime Shield mission seeks to form one or more protective rings around a high 
value unit in a strike group, such as an aircraft carrier. An attack submarine would have to 
pass through these rings without detection to become an active threat. Manned platforms 
such as the LCS are used to perform this mission, but their high cost limits their numbers, 
and hence the size and coverage of the protective ring. Ideally, the ring should be large 
enough to provide safe freedom of movement to the high-value unit, and there should be 
multiple rings to provide defense in depth and mitigate the possibility of imperfect detection. 
The motivation for using USVs is that lower cost should enable higher numbers and better 
coverage [4]. 
Considerations for the Protected Passage mission are similar, except that the 
protective ring must move along with the strike group. This is harder to accomplish because 
it is difficult for small USVs to keep up with a transiting strike group in the open ocean, 
especially in high sea states. Larger USVs such as Sea Hunter [5] are more expensive than 
smaller ones, although they are still less expensive than manned platforms such as the 
LCS.  
Some of the USV types recommended for ASW missions in the USV Master Plan are 
shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, reproduced from [1]. 
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Figure 2. Snorkeler Class USV [1] 
 
Figure 3. Fleet Class USV [1] 
Student projects at NPS developed requirements analyses and architectural designs 
for hypothetical USVs that perform the Maritime Shield and Protected Passage missions. 
These works have contributed to the ideas that have been refined and presented here. 
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Security Mitigations for UxVs 
Security threats and mitigations have been analyzed in detail in [2]. Here we 
summarize salient points and point out implications for requirements, open architectures, 
and acquisition. 
Physical Intrusions 
A factor that distinguishes security concerns for UxVs from those of other kinds of 
military systems is that they are more susceptible to capture by adversaries. Since physical 
tamper resistance has limits, it is extremely difficult to protect systems from attackers that 
have physical access [6]. Mitigations for this hazard include the following: 
• Limit the sensitive information contained in UxVs to the bare minimum 
needed. 
• Encrypt all sensitive information held in non-volatile memory. 
• Protect the encryption keys with multiple redundant methods for defense in 
depth. 
• Use multiple methods for sensing intrusions and erase sensitive data if 
intrusions are detected. 
• Provide locally controlled physical self-destruct mechanisms that can be 
activated during conflict. 
Mitigations such as these should be formulated as standard reusable requirements 
fragments that can be incorporated by reference into any contract for unmanned military 
systems. 
Since professional adversaries will eventually find ways to compromise barriers, an 
arms race in developing countermeasures, counter-countermeasures, and so on is likely to 
ensue. This implies the following: 
1. Frequent changes to requirements related to the above concerns are to be 
expected,  
2. The methods used to mitigate these hazards should be isolated as separate 
components in the open architecture, with standard interfaces controlled by 
the government, and  
3. An ongoing improvement process producing a series of frequently updated 
implementations should be included in the acquisition plan.  
This part of development is a prime candidate for rapid prototyping, Middle-Tier 
Acquisition (MTA), and continuing penetration testing and improvement to discover and 
counter vulnerabilities before adversaries do so. Due to the similarities of concerns for all 
types of UxVs, this process should be common to all programs developing unmanned 
systems. The Navy and the DoD need methods for allocating resources, distributing results, 
and coordinating fielding of improvements developed in this way. 
Spoofed Communication 
Communication is critical for unmanned systems, especially those that are not fully 
autonomous. If a UxV is captured and its encryption keys are compromised, they could be 
used to send misleading information to the strike group, or to infect ships’ computers with 
malware. Mitigations include: 
• Ensuring that every UxV has a unique encryption key that is different for each 
mission, so that compromising the keys of one UxV does not affect the 
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operation of the others and the time window for potential spoofed interactions 
with the strike group is limited. 
• Monitoring the locations of the UxVs from the controlling ships, and block 
communications from them if they deviate too far from planned positions. 
• Limiting connections between UxV communications and ship’s networks, and 
intensively monitor/analyze traffic along those connections, looking for 
potential cyber threats. 
• Using frequency hopping for communication, with a different pattern for each 
mission and UxV, to make the communications more difficult for adversaries 
to monitor and manipulate. 
• Protecting the frequency hopping patterns with tamper resistance and 
intrusion detection. 
Acquisition implications are similar: all of the above should be incorporated into 
standard reusable requirements modules and open architecture components, shared across 
different types of UxVs, and refined by a continuous prototyping and red teaming process. 
Compromised Sensors 
Since GPS signals are not encrypted, they can be spoofed. Adversaries could 
therefore control the movement of our unmanned systems by manipulating these signals if 
they rely solely on GPS for determining where they are and deciding which way they should 
move. Implications are as follows: 
• Own platform location should be a standard service in the open architecture 
for UxVs. 
• The architecture should include a standard structure for multiple sources of 
position data. 
• This structure should include standard interfaces and methods for fusing the 
data, detecting inconsistencies, and reacting to them as possible indications 
of attacks in progress. 
• In the longer term, an encrypted channel should be added to GPS and feeds 
from other remote positioning systems. 
Standard requirements and implemented components for these functions should be 
developed that can be shared across different types of UxVs. 
Implications for System Architecture and Acquisition 
Many different types of unmanned vehicles and systems have similar security 
concerns. This suggests that principles of Navy Open Architecture should be applied and 
extended to organize, manage, and continue to improve the best known mitigations for 
these concerns, and to ensure that the same solutions, components, and improvements can 
be systematically shared across this family of diverse systems that nevertheless share many 
common characteristics.  
The above approach is easiest when requirements can be factored into independent 
parts, variants in each part can be characterized by feature parameters [6], and each part 
can be allocated to a single subsystem. In such cases, these subsystems can become 
components in a standardized open architecture, standardized interfaces can be developed 
that can be incorporated into the architecture, and system improvement can proceed by 
replacing these subsystems with variants that conform to the same standardized interface. 
The key to this approach is that all UxVs should share the same architecture, or at least the 
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same architecture fragments that include the common subsystems and their interfaces to 
the rest of the UxV. Such fragments should be formulated as Technical Reference 
Frameworks (TRFs) [7].Benefits enabled by this approach include the following: 
• Streamlining acquisition of security improvements by contracting for new 
versions of specific subsystems, rather than entire systems. Each 
development step can then be smaller, faster, and less expensive. 
• Reuse of security-critical subsystems and associated improvements across 
many different unmanned platforms. 
• More competition, leading to better and more cost-effective products. 
• Less time lag between discovery of new solutions and fielded capabilities. 
Unexpected changes in circumstances can require changes in the capabilities of 
unmanned systems. In the extreme case, this can include sudden changes in mission due to 
emergence of new threats, which would require rapid and reliable system reconfiguration in 
the field. Acquiring systems with such capabilities poses new challenges, such as how to 
write requirements for such capabilities into a contract, how to ensure that they can be met 
before including them in a contract, and how to check whether they have or have not been 
met when the product is delivered at the end of development. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work 
Conclusions 
Maintaining the security of unmanned systems is a dynamic process that can be 
strongly affected by changing circumstances. Responding to such changes requires 
capabilities for rapid reconfiguration of these systems, possibly in the field with short notice. 
This suggests that the requirements and architectures of such systems should be organized 
around standardized, modular parts, and that each of those parts should have multiple 
variants matching likely future circumstances. The intent is to enable rapid reconfiguration 
by component swapping, matching capabilities to current situations using a plug-and-fight 
concept.  
As illustrated by the example in the first section of this paper, one possible event that 
can trigger the need for rapid reconfiguration is a transition from peacetime to active conflict. 
There are many other possible triggers, such as discovery of a new software vulnerability, 
development of a method for breaking an encryption method that was previously believed to 
be secure, development of new adversary capabilities to deny wireless communications, to 
falsify sensor readings, to expose sensitive information by reverse engineering captured 
unmanned systems, and so on. 
The plug-and-fight vision raises significant challenges for test and evaluation. 
Previous work has shown that cost of testing reconfigurable systems increases rapidly with 
the number of independent configuration choices, so that traditional test and evaluation 
methods become unaffordable if the goal is to precertify high reliability for all possible 
configurations. Current practice to avoid this problem is to certify only the configurations that 
are actually fielded. This slows down reconfiguration because each new configuration would 
need testing before it can be fielded. Some mitigations for this problem are described in [6], 
[7], [8], [9], [10], [11], and [12]. 
Recommendations 
• Develop a Technical Reference Framework (TRF) for unmanned systems 
that defines fragments of system and software architecture for unmanned 
platforms. This TRF should include standard interfaces for services needed 
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for all unmanned platforms, such as mitigations for common security risks 
that include physical intrusion, spoofed communication, and compromised 
sensor feeds. These interfaces should be standardized because the details of 
their behavior will need to be tailored to different situations and different 
platforms, and variants may need to be swapped out in the field as 
circumstances change. Standardized interfaces are needed to effectively 
support interchangeable components that can adapt capabilities in a plug-
and-fight mode. 
• Establish a Navy or Joint organization for the purpose of developing, 
negotiating, refining, evaluating, and managing improvements to the 
standardized interfaces recommended above and provide it with the 
resources needed to support such an ongoing effort. 
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